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Abstract
This paper handles a kind of strategic game called potential games and develops a novel learning
algorithm Payoff-based Inhomogeneous Partially Irrational Play (PIPIP). The present algorithm is based
on Distributed Inhomogeneous Synchronous Learning (DISL) presented in an existing work but, unlike
DISL, PIPIP allows agents to make irrational decisions with a specified probability, i.e. agents can choose
an action with a low utility from the past actions stored in the memory. Due to the irrational decisions,
we can prove convergence in probability of collective actions to potential function maximizers. Finally,
we demonstrate the effectiveness of the present algorithm through experiments on a sensor coverage
problem. It is revealed through the demonstration that the present learning algorithm successfully leads
agents to around potential function maximizers even in the presence of undesirable Nash equilibria.
We also see through the experiment with a moving density function that PIPIP has adaptability to
environmental changes.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperative control of multi-agent systems basically aims at designing local interactions of
agents in order to meet some global objective of the group [1], [2]. It is also required depending
on scenarios that agents achieve the global objective under imperfect prior knowledge on envi-
ronments while adapting to the network and environmental changes. Nevertheless, conventional
cooperative control schemes do not always embody such functions. For example, in sensor
deployment or coverage, most of the control schemes as in [3], [4], [5] assume prior knowledge
on a density function defined over a mission space and hence are hardly applicable to the mission
over unknown surroundings. A game theoretic framework as in [6] holds tremendous potential
for overcoming the drawback of the conventional schemes.
A game theoretic approach to cooperative control formulates the problems as non-cooperative
games and identifies the objective in cooperative control with arrival at some specific Nash
equilibria [6], [7], [8]. In particular, it is shown by J. Marden et al. [6] that a variety of cooperative
control problems are related to so-called potential games [9]. Unlike the other game theory,
potential games give a design perspective, which consists of two kinds of design problem: utility
design and learning algorithm design [10]. The objective of utility design is to align local utility
functions to be maximized by each agent so that the resulting game constitutes a potential game,
where the literature [11], [12] provides general design methodologies. The learning algorithm
design determines action selection rules of agents so that the actions converge to Nash equilibria.
In this paper, we focus on the learning algorithm design for cooperative control of multi-agent
systems. A lot of learning algorithms have been established in game theory literature and recently
some algorithms are also developed mainly by J. Marden and his collaborators. The algorithms
therein are classified into several categories depending on their features.
The first issue is whether an algorithm presumes finite or infinite memories. For example,
Fictitious Play (FP) [13], Regret Matching (RM) [14], Joint Strategy Fictitious Play (JSFP)
with Inertia [15] and Regret-Based Dynamics [16] require infinite number of memories for
executing the algorithms. Meanwhile, Adaptive Play (AP) [17], Better Reply Process with Finite
Memory and Inertia [18], (Restrictive) Spatial Adaptive Play ((R)SAP) [19], [6] and Payoff-based
Dynamics (PD) [20], Payoff-based version of Log-Linear Learning (PLLL) [21] and Distributed
Inhomogeneous Synchronous Learning (DISL) [7] require only a finite number of memories. Of
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3course, the finite memory algorithms are more preferable for practical applications.
The second issue is what information is necessary for executing learning algorithms. For
example, FP presumes that all the information of the other agents’ actions are available, which
strongly restricts its applications. On the other hand, RM, JSFP with Inertia and (R)SAP assume
availability of a so-called virtual payoff, i.e. the utility which would be obtained if an agent
chose an action. Moreover, PD, PLLL and DISL utilize only the actual payoffs obtained after
taking actions, which has a potential to overcome the aforementioned drawback of the sensor
coverage schemes [7].
The main objective of standard game theory is to compute Nash equilibria and hence most
of the above algorithms except for [6], [21] assure only convergence to pure Nash equilibria.
However, in most of cooperative control problems, it is insufficient for achieving the global
objective and selection of the most efficient equilibria is required [21]. In this paper, we thus
deal with convergence of the actions to the Nash equilibria maximizing the potential function
which are called optimal Nash equilibria in this paper, since the potential function is usually
designed in many cooperative control problems so that its maximizers coincide with the action
profiles achieving the global objectives.
The primary contribution of this paper is to develop a novel learning algorithm called Payoff-
based Inhomogeneous Partially Irrational Play (PIPIP). The learning algorithm is based on
DISL presented in [7] and inherits its several desirable features: (i) The algorithm requires finite
and a little memory, (ii) The algorithm is payoff-based, (iii) The algorithm allows agents to
choose actions in a synchronous fashion at each iteration, (iv) The action selection procedure in
PIPIP consists of simple rules, (v) The algorithm is capable of dealing with constraints on action
selection. The main difference of PIPIP from DISL is to allow agents to make irrational decisions
with a certain probability, which renders agents opportunities to escape from undesirable Nash
equilibria. Thanks to the irrational decisions, PIPIP assures that the actions of the group converge
in probability to optimal Nash equilibria, though only convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium
is proved in [7]. Meanwhile, some learning algorithms as in [6], [21] dealing with convergence
to the optimal Nash equilibria have been presented and we also mention the advantages of
PIPIP over these learning algorithms in the following. RSAP [6] guarantees convergence of the
distribution of actions to a stationary distribution such that the probability staying the optimal
Nash equilibria is arbitrarily specified by a design parameter. However, RSAP is not synchronous
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4and virtual payoff-based and hence its applications are restricted. PLLL [21] also allows irrational
and exploration decisions similarly to PIPIP and the resulting conclusion is almost compatible
with this paper. However, in [21], how to handle the action constraints is not explicitly shown
and convergence in probability to the optimal Nash equilibria is not proved in a strict sense.
The secondary contribution of this paper is to demonstrate the effectiveness of the present
learning algorithm through experiments on a sensor coverage problem, where the learning
algorithm is applied to a robotic system compensated by local controllers and logics. Such
investigations have not been sufficiently addressed in the existing works. Here, we mainly
check the performance of the learning algorithm in finite time and adaptability to environmental
changes. In order to deal with the former issue, we prepare obstacles in the mission space to
generate apparent undesirable Nash equilibria. Then, we compare the performance of PIPIP
with DISL. The results therein will support our claim that what this paper provides is not a
minor extension of [7] and contains a significant contribution from a practical point of view.
We next demonstrate the adaptability by employing a moving density function defined over the
mission space. Though adaptation to time-varying density is in principle expected for payoff-
based algorithms, its demonstration has not been addressed in previous works. We see from
the results that desirable group behaviors, i.e. tracking to the moving high density region are
achieved by PIPIP even in the absence of any knowledge on the density.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we give some terminologies and basis
necessary for stating the results of this paper. In Section III, we present the learning algorithm
PIPIP and state the main result associated with the algorithm, i.e. convergence in probability to
the optimal Nash equilibria. Then, Section IV gives the proof of the main result. In Section V,
we demonstrate the effectiveness of PIPIP through experiments on a sensor coverage problem.
Finally, Section VI draws conclusions.
II. PRELIMINARY
A. Constrained Potential Games
In this paper, we consider a constrained strategic game Γ = (V,A, {Ui(·)}i∈V , {Ri(·)}i∈V).
Here, V := {1, · · · , n} is the set of agents’ unique identifiers. The set A is called a collective
action set and defined as A := A1×· · ·×An, where Ai, i ∈ V is the set of actions which agent
i can take. The function Ui : A → R is a so-called utility function of agent i ∈ V and each
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5agent basically behaves so as to maximize the function. The function Ri : Ai → 2Ai provides
a so-called constrained action set and Ri(ai) is the set of actions which agent i will be able to
take in case he takes an action ai. Namely, at each iteration t ∈ Z+ := {0, 1, 2, · · · }, each agent
chooses an action ai(t) from the set Ri(ai(t− 1)).
Throughout this paper, we denote collection of actions other than agent i by
a−i := (a1, · · · , ai−1, ai+1, · · · , an).
Then, the joint action a = (a1, · · · , an) ∈ A is described as a = (ai, a−i). Let us now make the
following assumptions.
Assumption 1 The function Ri : Ai → 2Ai satisfies the following three conditions.
• (Reversibility [6]) For any i ∈ V and any actions a1i , a2i ∈ Ai, the inclusion a2i ∈ Ri(a1i ) is
equivalent to a1i ∈ Ri(a2i ).
• (Feasibility [6]) For any i ∈ V and any actions a1i , ami ∈ Ai, there exists a sequence of
actions a1i → a2i → · · · → ami satisfying ali ∈ Ri(al−1i ) for all l ∈ {1, · · · , m}.
• For any i ∈ V and any action ai ∈ Ai, the number of available actions in Ri(ai) is greater
than or equal to 3.
Assumption 2 For any (a, a′) satisfying a′i ∈ Ri(ai) and a−i = a′−i, the inequality Ui(a′) −
Ui(a) < 1 holds true for all i ∈ V .
Assumption 2 means that when only one agent changes his action, the difference in the utility
function Ui should be smaller than 1. This assumption is satisfied by just scaling all agents’
utility functions appropriately.
Let us now introduce the potential games under consideration in this paper.
Definition 1 (Constrained Potential Games [6], [7]) A constrained strategic game Γ is said
to be a constrained potential game with potential function φ : A → R if for all i ∈ V , every
ai ∈ Ai and every a−i ∈
∏
j 6=iAj , the following equation holds for every a′i ∈ Ri(ai).
Ui(a
′
i, a−i)− Ui(ai, a−i) = φ(a
′
i, a−i)− φ(ai, a−i) (1)
Throughout this paper, we suppose that a potential function φ is designed so that its maximizers
coincide with the joint action a achieving a global objective of the group. Under the situation,
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6(1) implies that if an agent changes his action, the change of the local objective function is equal
to that of the group objective function.
We next define the Nash equilibria as below.
Definition 2 (Constrained Nash Equillibria) For a constrained strategic game Γ, a collection
of actions a∗ ∈ A is said to be a constrained pure Nash equilibrium if the following equation
holds for all i ∈ V .
Ui(a
∗
i , a
∗
−i) = max
ai∈Ri(a∗i )
Ui(ai, a
∗
−i) (2)
It is known [7], [9] that any constrained potential game has at least one pure Nash equilibrium
and, in particular, a potential function maximizer is a Nash equilibrium, which is called an optimal
Nash equilibrium in this paper. However, there may exist undesirable pure Nash equilibria not
maximizing the potential function. In order to reach the optimal Nash equilibria while avoiding
undesirable equilibria, we have to design appropriately a learning algorithm which determines
how to select an action at each iteration.
B. Resistance Tree
Let us consider a Markov process {P 0t } defined over a finite state space X . A perturbation
of {P 0t } is a Markov process whose transition probabilities are slightly perturbed. Specifically,
a perturbed Markov process {P εt }, ε ∈ [0, 1] is defined as a process such that the transition of
{P εt } follows {P 0t } with probability 1 − ε and does not follow with probability ε. Then, we
introduce a notion of regular perturbation as below.
Definition 3 (Regular Perturbation [19]) A family of stochastic processes {P εt } is called a
regular perturbation of {P 0t } if the following conditions are satisfied:
(A1) For some ε∗ > 0, the process {P εt } is irreducible and aperiodic for all ε ∈ (0, ε∗].
(A2) Let us denote by P εxy the transition probability from x ∈ X to y ∈ X along with the
Markov process {P εt }. Then, limε→0P εxy = P 0xy holds for all x, y ∈ X .
(A3) If P εxy > 0 for some ε, then there exists a real number χ(x→ y) ≥ 0 such that
limε→0
P εxy
εχ(x→y)
∈ (0,∞), (3)
where χ(x→ y) is called resistance of transition from x to y.
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7Remark that, from (A1), if {P εt } is a regular perturbation of {P 0t }, then {P εt } has the unique
stationary distribution µ(ε) for each ε > 0.
We next introduce the resistance λ(r) of a path r from x ∈ X to x′ ∈ X along with transitions
x(0) = x→ x(2) → · · · → x(m) = x′ as the value satisfying
lim
ε→0
P ε(r)
ελ(r)
∈ (0,∞), (4)
where P ε(r) denotes the probability of the sequence of transitions. Then, it is easy to confirm
that λ(r) is simply given by
λ(r) =
m−1∑
i=0
χ(x(i) → x(i+1)). (5)
A state x ∈ X is said to communicate with state y ∈ X if both x  y and y  x hold,
where the notation x  y implies that y is accessible from x i.e. a process starting at state x
has non-zero probability of transitioning into y at some point. A recurrent communication class
is a class such that every pair of states in the class communicates with each other and no state
outside the class is accessible to the class. Now, let H1, · · · , HJ be recurrent communication
classes of Markov process {P 0t }. Then, within each class, there is a path with zero resistance
from every state to every other. In case of a perturbed Markov process {P εt }, there may exist
several paths from states in Hl to states in Hk for any two distinct recurrent communication
classes Hl and Hk. The minimal resistance among all such paths is denoted by χlk.
Let us now define a weighted complete directed graph G = (H,H×H,W) over the recurrent
communication classes H = {H1, · · · , HJ}, where the weight wlk ∈ W of each edge (Hl, Hk)
is equal to the minimal resistance χlk. We next define l-tree which is a spanning tree over G
with a root node Hl ∈ H. We also denote by G(l) the set of all l-trees. The resistance of an
l-tree is the sum of the weights on all the edges of the tree. The stochastic potential of the
recurrent communication class Hl is the minimal resistance among all l-trees in G(l). We also
introduce the notion of stochastically stable state as below.
Definition 4 (Stochastically Stable State [19]) A state x ∈ X is said to be stochastically
stable, if x satisfies limε→0+µx(ε) > 0, where µx(ε) is the value of an element of stationary
distribution µ(ε) corresponding to state x.
Using the above terminologies, we introduce the following well known result which connects
the stochastically stable states and stochastic potential.
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8Proposition 1 [19] Let {P εt } be a regular perturbation of {P 0t }. Then limε→0+µ(ε) exists and the
limiting distribution µ(0) is a stationary distribution of {P 0t }. Moreover the stochastically stable
states are contained in the recurrent communication classes with minimum stochastic potential.
C. Ergodicity
Discrete-time Markov processes can be divided into two types: time-homogeneous and time-
inhomogeneous, where a Markov process {Pt} is said to be time-homogeneous if the transition
matrix denoted by Pt is independent of the time and to be a time-inhomogeneous if it is time
dependent. We also denote the probability of the state transition from time k0 to time k by
P (k0, k) =
∏k−1
t=k0
Pt, 0 ≤ k0 < k.
For a Markov process {Pt}, we introduce the notion of ergodicity.
Definition 5 (Strong Ergodicity [23]) A Markov process {Pt} is said to be strongly ergodic if
there exists a stochastic vector µ∗ such that for any distribution µ on X and time k0, we have
limk→∞µP (k0, k) = µ
∗
.
Definition 6 (Weak Ergodicity [23]) A Markov process {Pt} is said to be weakly ergodic if
the following equation holds.
lim
k→∞
(Pxz(k0, k)− Pyz(k0, k)) = 0 ∀x, y, z ∈ X , ∀k0 ∈ Z+
If {Pt} is strongly ergodic, the distribution µ converges to the unique distribution µ∗ from any
initial state. Weak ergodicity implies that the information on the initial state vanishes as time
increases though convergence of µ may not be guaranteed. Note that the notions of weak and
strong ergodicity are equivalent in case of time-homogeneous Markov processes.
We finally introduce the following well-known results on ergodicity.
Proposition 2 [23] A Markov process {Pt} is strongly ergodic if the following conditions hold:
(B1) The Markov process {Pt} is weakly ergodic.
(B2) For each t, there exists a stochastic vector µt on X such that µt is the left eigenvector
of the transition matrix P (t) with eigenvalue 1.
(B3) The eigenvector µt in (B2) satisfies ∑∞t=0∑x∈X |µtx − µt+1x | < ∞. Moreover, if µ∗ =
limt→∞ µ
t
, then µ∗ is the vector in Definition 5.
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9III. LEARNING ALGORITHM AND MAIN RESULT
In this section, we present a learning algorithm called Payoff-based Inhomogeneous Partially
Irrational Play (PIPIP) and state the main result of this paper. At each iteration t ∈ Z+,
the learning algorithm chooses an action according to the following procedure assuming that
each agent i ∈ V stores previous two chosen actions ai(t − 2), ai(t − 1) and the outcomes
Ui(a(t− 2)), Ui(a(t− 1)). Each agent first updates a parameter ε called exploration rate by
ε(t) = t−
1
n(D+1) , (6)
where D is defined as D := maxi∈VDi and Di is the minimal number of steps required for
transitioning between any two actions of agent i.
Then, each agent compares the values of Ui(a(t − 1)) and Ui(a(t − 2)). If Ui(a(t − 1)) ≥
Ui(a(t− 2)) holds, then he chooses action ai(t) according to the rule:
• ai(t) is randomly chosen from Ri(ai(t−1)) \ {ai(t−1)} with probability ε(t), (it is called
an exploratory decision).
• ai(t) = ai(t− 1) with probability 1− ε(t).
Otherwise (Ui(a(t− 1)) < Ui(a(t− 2))), action ai(t) is chosen according to the rule:
• ai(t) is randomly chosen from Ri(ai(t − 1)) \ {ai(t − 1), ai(t − 2)} with probability ε(t)
(it is called an exploratory decision).
• ai(t) = ai(t− 1) with probability
(1− ε(t))(κ · ε(t)∆i), ∆i := Ui(a(t− 2))− Ui(a(t− 1)) (7)
(it is called an irrational decision).
• ai(t) = ai(t− 2) with probability
(1− ε(t))(1− κ · ε(t)∆i). (8)
The parameter κ should be chosen so as to satisfy
κ ∈
( 1
C − 1
,
1
2
]
, C := max
i∈V
max
ai∈Ai
|Ri(ai)|, (9)
where |Ri(ai)| is the number of elements of the set Ri(ai). It is clear under the third item of
Assumption 1 that the action ai(t) is well-defined.
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Algorithm 1 Payoff-based Inhomogeneous Partially Irrational Play (PIPIP)
Initialization: Action a is chosen randomly from A. Set a1i ← ai, a2i ← ai, U1i ←
Ui(a), U
2
i ← Ui(a), ∆i ← 0 for all i ∈ V and t← 2.
Step 1: ε← t(−1/(n(D+1))).
Step 2: If U1i ≥ U2i , then set
atmpi ←


rnd(Ri(a
1
i ) \ {a
1
i }), w.p. ε
a1i , w.p. 1− ε
.
Otherwise, set
atmpi ←


rnd(Ri(a
1
i ) \ {a
1
i , a
2
i }), w.p. ε(t)
a1i , w.p. (1− ε)(κ · ε∆i)
a2i , w.p. (1− ε)(1− κ · ε∆i)
.
Step 3: Execute the selected action atmpi and receive U
tmp
i ← Ui(a
tmp).
Step 4: Set a2i ← a1i , a1i ← a
tmp
i , U
2
i ← U
1
i , U
1
i ← U
tmp
i and ∆i ← U2i − U1i .
Step 5: t← t + 1 and go to Step 1.
Finally, each agent i executes the selected action ai(t) and computes the resulting utility
Ui(a(t)) via feedbacks from environment and neighboring agents. At the next iteration, agents
repeat the same procedure.
The algorithm PIPIP is compactly described in Algorithm 1, where the function rnd(A′)
outputs an action chosen randomly from the set A′. Note that the algorithm with a constant
ε(t) = ε ∈ (0, 1/2] is called Payoff-based Homogeneous Partially Irrational Play (PHPIP),
which will be used for the proof of the main result of this paper.
PIPIP is developed based on the learning algorithm DISL presented in [7]. The main difference
of PIPIP from DISL is that agents may choose the action with the lower utility in Step 2 with
probability (1−ε)(κ ·ε∆i) which depends on the difference of the last two steps’ utilities ∆i and
the parameters κ and ε. Thanks to the irrational decisions, agents can escape from undesirable
Nash equilibria as will be proved in the next section.
We are now ready to state the main result of this paper. Before mentioning it, we define
B := {(a, a′) ∈ A×A| a′i ∈ Ri(ai) ∀i ∈ V}. (10)
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and ζ(Γ) as the set of the optimal Nash equilibria, i.e. potential function maximizers, of a
constrained potential game Γ.
Theorem 1 Consider a constrained potential game Γ satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2. Suppose
that each agent behaves according to Algorithm 1. Then, a Markov process {Pt} is defined over
the space B and the following equation is satisfied.
lim
t→∞
Prob [z(t) ∈ diag (ζ(Γ))] = 1, (11)
where z(t) := (a(t− 1), a(t)) and diag(A′) = {(a, a) ∈ A×A| a ∈ A′}, A′ ⊆ A.
Equation (11) means that the probability that agents executing PIPIP take one of the potential
function maximizers converge to 1. The proof of this theorem will be shown in the next section.
In PIPIP, the parameter ε(t) is updated by (6) to prove the above theorem, which is the same
as DISL. However, this update rule takes long time to reach a sufficiently small ε(t) when the
size of the game, i.e. n(D+1) is large. Thus, from the practical point of view, we might have to
decrease ε(t) based on heuristics or use PHPIP with a sufficiently small ε. Even in such cases,
the following theorem at least holds similarly to the paper [20].
Theorem 2 Consider a constrained potential game Γ satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2. Suppose
that each agent behaves according to PHPIP. Then, given any probability p < 1, if the exploration
rate ε is sufficiently small, for all sufficiently large time t ∈ Z+, the following equation holds.
Prob [z(t) ∈ diag (ζ(Γ))] > p. (12)
Theorem 2 assures that the optimal actions are eventually selected with high probability as long
as the final value of ε(t) is sufficiently small irrespective of the decay rate of ε(t).
IV. PROOF OF MAIN RESULT
In this section, we prove the main result of this paper (Theorem 1). We first consider PHPIP
with a constant exploration rate ε. The state z(t) = (a(t− 1), a(t)) for PHPIP with ε constitutes
a perturbed Markov process {P εt } on the state space B = {(a, a′) ∈ A×A| a′i ∈ Ri(ai) ∀i ∈ V}.
In terms of the Markov process {P εt } induced by PHPIP, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 1 The Markov process {P εt } induced by PHPIP applied to a constrained potential game
Γ is a regular perturbation of {P 0t } under Assumption 1.
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Proof: Consider a feasible transition z1 → z2 with z1 = (a0, a1) ∈ B and z2 = (a1, a2) ∈ B
and partition the set of agents V according to their behaviors along with the transition as
Λ1 = {i ∈ V| Ui(a
1) ≥ Ui(a
0), a2i ∈ Ri(a
1
i ) \ {a
1
i }},
Λ2 = {i ∈ V| Ui(a
1) ≥ Ui(a
0), a2i = a
1
i },
Λ3 = {i ∈ V| Ui(a
1) < Ui(a
0), a2i ∈ Ri(a
1
i ) \ {a
0
i , a
1
i }},
Λ4 = {i ∈ V| Ui(a
1) < Ui(a
0), a2i = a
1
i },
Λ5 = {i ∈ V| Ui(a
1) < Ui(a
0), a2i = a
0
i }.
Then, the probability of the transition z1 → z2 is represented as
P εz1z2 =
∏
i∈Λ1
ε
|Ri(a
1
i )| − 1
×
∏
i∈Λ2
(1− ε)×
∏
i∈Λ3
ε
|Ri(a
1
i )| − hi
×
×
∏
i∈Λ4
(1− ε)κε∆i ×
∏
i∈Λ5
(1− ε)(1− κε∆i), (13)
where hi = 1 if a0i = a1i and hi = 2 otherwise. We see from (13) that the resistance of transition
z1 → z2 defined in (3) is given by |Λ1|+ |Λ3|+
∑
i∈Λ4
∆i since
0 < lim
ε→0
P εz1z2
ε|Λ1|+|Λ3|+
∑
i∈Λ4
∆i
=
∏
i∈Λ1
1
|Ri(a1i )| − 1
∏
i∈Λ3
1
|Ri(a1i )| − hi
× κ|Λ4| < +∞ (14)
holds. Thus, (A3) in Definition 3 is satisfied. In addition, it is straightforward from the procedure
of PHPIP to confirm the condition (A2).
It is thus sufficient to check (A1) in Definition 3. From the rule of taking exploratory actions
in Algorithm 1 and the second item of Assumption 1, we immediately see that the set of
the states accessible from any z ∈ B is equal to B. This implies that the perturbed Markov
process {P εt } is irreducible. We next check aperiodicity of {P εt }. It is clear that any state in
diag(A) = {(a, a) ∈ A × A| a ∈ A} has period 1. Let us next pick any (a0, a1) from the set
B \ diag(A). Since a0i ∈ Ri(a1i ) holds iff a1i ∈ Ri(a0i ) from Assumption 1, the following two
paths are both feasible: (a0, a1)→ (a1, a0)→ (a0, a1), (a0, a1)→ (a1, a1)→ (a1, a0)→ (a0, a1).
This implies that the period of state (a0, a1) is 1 and the process {P εt } is proved to be aperiodic.
Hence the process {P εt } is both irreducible and aperiodic, which means (A1) in Definition 3.
In summary, conditions (A1)–(A3) in Definition 3 are satisfied and the proof is completed.
From Lemma 1, the perturbed Markov process {P εt } is irreducible and hence there exists a
unique stationary distribution µ(ε) for every ε. Moreover, because {P εt } is a regular perturbation
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of {P 0t }, we see from the former half of Proposition 1 that limε→0+ µ(ε) exists and the limiting
distribution µ(0) is the stationary distribution of {P 0t }.
We also have the following lemma on the Markov process {P εt } induced by PHPIP.
Lemma 2 Consider the Markov process {P εt } induced by PHPIP applied to a constrained
potential game Γ. Then, the recurrent communication classes {Hi} of the unperturbed Markov
process {P 0t } are given by elements of diag(A) = {(a, a) ∈ A×A| a ∈ A}, namely
Hi = {(a
i, ai)}, i ∈ 1, · · · , |A|. (15)
Proof: Because of the rule at Step 2 of PHPIP, it is clear that any state belonging to diag(A)
cannot move to another state without explorations, which implies that all the states in diag(A)
itself form recurrent communication classes of the unperturbed Markov process {P 0t }.
We next consider the states in B \ diag(A) and prove that these states are never included
in recurrent communication classes of the unperturbed Markov process {P 0t }. Here, we use
induction. We first consider the case of n = 1. If U1(a11) ≥ U1(a01), then the transition (a01, a11)→
(a11, a
1
1) is taken. Otherwise, a sequence of transitions (a01, a11)→ (a11, a01)→ (a01, a01) occurs. Thus,
in case of n = 1, the state (a01, a11) ∈ B \ diag(A) is never included in recurrent communication
classes of {P 0t }.
We next make a hypothesis that there exists a k ∈ Z+ such that all the states in B \ diag(A)
are not included in recurrent communication classes of the unperturbed Markov process {P 0t }
for all n ≤ k. Then, we consider the case n = k + 1, where there are three possible cases:
(i) Ui(a1) ≥ Ui(a0) ∀i ∈ V = {1, · · · , k + 1},
(ii) Ui(a1) < Ui(a0) ∀i ∈ V = {1, · · · , k + 1},
(iii) Ui(a1) ≥ Ui(a0) for l agents where l ∈ {2, · · · , k}.
In case (i), the transition (a0, a1)→ (a1, a1) must occur for ε = 0 and, in case (ii), the transition
(a0, a1)→ (a1, a0)→ (a0, a0) should be selected. Thus, all the states in B\diag(A) satisfying (i)
or (ii) are never included in recurrent communication classes. In case (iii), at the next iteration,
all the agents i satisfying Ui(a1) ≥ Ui(a0) choose the current action. Then, such agents possess a
single action in the memory and, in case of ε = 0, each agent has to choose either of the actions
in the memory. Namely, these agents never change their actions in all subsequent iterations. The
resulting situation is thus the same as the case of n = k + 1 − l. From the above hypothesis,
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we can conclude that the states in case (iii) are also not included in recurrent communication
classes. In summary, the states in B\diag(A) are never included in the recurrent communication
classes of {P 0t }. The proof is thus completed.
A feasible path over the process {P εt } from z ∈ B to z′ ∈ B is especially said to be a route
if both of the two nodes z and z′ are elements of diag(A) ⊂ B. Note that a route is a path and
hence the resistance of the route is also given by (4). Especially, we define a straight route as
follows, where we use the notation
Esingle := {(z = (a, a), z
′ = (a′, a′)) ∈ diag(A)× diag(A)|
∃i ∈ V s.t. ai ∈ Ri(a′i), ai 6= a
′
i and a−i = a′−i}. (16)
Definition 7 (Straight Route) A route between any two states z0 = (a0, a0) and z1 = (a1, a1)
in diag(A) such that (z0, z1) ∈ Esingle is said to be a straight route if the path is given by the
transitions on the Markov process {P εt } such that only one agent i changes his action from a0i
to a1i at first iteration and the explored agent i selects the same action a1i at the next iteration
while the other agents choose the same action a0−i = a1−i during the two steps.
In terms of the straight route, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Consider paths from any state z0 = (a0, a0) ∈ diag(A) to any state z1 = (a1, a1) ∈
diag(A) such that (z0, z1) ∈ Esingle over the Markov process {P εt } induced by PHPIP applied
to a constrained potential game Γ. Then, under Assumption 2, the resistance λ(r) of the straight
route r from z0 to z1 is strictly smaller than 2 and the resistance λ(r) is minimal among all
paths from z0 to z1.
Proof: Along with the straight route, only one agent i first changes action from a0i to a1i ,
whose probability is given by
(1− ε)n−1 ×
ε
|Ri(a0i )| − 1
. (17)
It is easy to confirm from (17) that the resistance of the transition (a0, a0) → (a0, a1) is equal
to 1. We next consider the transition from (a0, a1) to (a1, a1). If Ui(a1) ≥ Ui(a0) is true, the
probability of this transition is given by (1 − ε)n, whose resistance is equal to 0. Otherwise,
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Ui(a
1) < Ui(a
0) holds and the probability of this transition is given by (1− ε)n × κε∆i , whose
resistance is ∆i. Let us now notice that the resistance λ(r) of the straight route r is equal to
the sum of the resistances of transitions (a0, a0) → (a0, a1) and (a0, a1) → (a1, a1) from (5)
and that ∆i < 1 from Assumption 2. We can thus conclude that λ(r) is smaller than 2. It is
also easy to confirm that the resistance of paths such that more than 1 agents take exploratory
action should be greater than 2. Namely, the straight route gives the smallest resistance among
all paths from z0 = (a0, a0) to z1 = (a1, a1) and hence the proof is completed.
We also introduce the following notion.
Definition 8 (m-Straight-Route) An m-straight-route is a route which passes through m ver-
tices in diag(A) and all the routes between any two of these vertices are straight.
In terms of the route, we can prove the following lemma, which clarifies a connection between
the potential function and the resistance of the route.
Lemma 4 Consider the Markov process {P εt } induced by PHPIP applied to a constrained poten-
tial game Γ. Let us denote an m-straight-route r over {P εt } from state z0 = (a0, a0) ∈ diag(A)
to state z1 = (a1, a1) ∈ diag(A) by
z(0) = z0⇒z(1) ⇒ z(2)⇒z(3)⇒· · · z(m−3) ⇒ z(m−2)⇒z(m−1) = z1, (18)
where z(i) = (a(i), a(i)) ∈ diag(A), i ∈ {0, · · · , m − 1} and all the arrows between them are
straight routes. In addition, we denote its reverse route r′ by
z(0) = z0⇐z(1)⇐z(2)⇐z(3)⇐· · ·⇐z(m−3)⇐z(m−2)⇐z(m−1) = z1, (19)
which is also an m-straight route from z0 to z1. Then, under Assumption 2, if φ(a0) > φ(a1),
we have λ(r) > λ(r′).
Proof: We suppose that the route r contains p straight routes with resistance greater than 1
and r′ contains q straight routes with resistance greater than 1. Let us now denote the explored
agent along with the route z(i) ⇒ z(i+1) by ji and that with z(i) ⇐ z(i+1) by j′i. From the proof
of Lemma 3, the resistance of the route z(i) ⇒ z(i+1) should be exactly equal to 1 (in case of
Uji(a
(i+1)) ≥ Uji(a
(i))) or equal to 1 + ∆ji ∈ (1, 2) (in case of Uji(a(i+1)) < Uji(a(i))). From
(1), the following equation holds.
∆ji = Uji(a
(i))− Uji(a
(i+1)) = φ(a(i))− φ(a(i+1)) = Uj′i(a
(i))− Uj′i(a
(i+1)) = −∆j′i . (20)
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Namely, one of the resistances of the straight routes z(i) ⇒ z(i+1) and z(i+1) ⇐ z(i) is exactly
1 and the other is greater than 1 except for the case that Ui(a(i+1)) = Ui(a(i)) in which the
resistances are both equal to 1. An illustrative example of the relation is given as follows, where
the numbers put on arrows are the resistances of the routes.
z(0) = z0
1+∆j0⇒ z(1)
1
⇒ z(2)
1+∆j1⇒ z(3)
1
⇒ · · ·
1
⇒ z(m−3)
1
⇒ z(m−2)
1+∆jm−2
⇒ z(m−1) = z1
z(0) = z0
1
⇐ z(1)
1+∆j′1⇐ z(2)
1
⇐ z(3)
1+∆j′3⇐ · · ·
1+∆j′
m−4
⇐ z(m−3)
1+∆j′
m−3
⇐ z(m−2)
1
⇐ z(m−1) = z1
Namely, the inequality p + q ≤ m − 1 holds true. Let us now collect all the ∆ji such that the
resistance of z(i) ⇒ z(i+1) is greater than 1 and number them as ∆1,∆2, · · · ,∆p. Similarly, we
define ∆′1,∆′2, · · · ,∆′q for the reverse route r′. Then, from equations in (20), we obtain
∆1 +∆2 + · · ·+∆p − (∆
′
1 +∆
′
2 + · · ·+∆
′
q) = φ(a
0)− φ(a1). (21)
Note that (21) holds even in the presence of pairs (a(i), a(i+1)) such that Uji(a(i+1)) = Uji(a(i)).
Since ∆1+ · · ·+∆p = λ(r)− (m−1) and ∆′1+ · · ·+∆′q = λ(r′)− (m−1) from (5), we obtain
λ(r) = λ(r′) + φ(a0)− φ(a1). (22)
It is straightforward from (22) to prove the statement in the lemma.
Let us form the weighted digraph G over the recurrent communication classes for the Markov
process {P εt } induced by PHPIP as in Subsection II-B, where the weight wlk of each edge
(Hl, Hk) is equal to the minimal resistance χlk among all the paths connecting two recurrent
communication classes Hl and Hk. From Lemma 2, the nodes of the graph G are given by each
element of the set diag(A) and hence G = (diag(A), E ,W), E ⊆ diag(A)× diag(A). Since all
the recurrent communication classes have only one element as in (15), the weight wlk for any
two states zl, zk ∈ diag(A) is simply given by the path with minimal resistance among all paths
from zl to zk. In addition, Lemma 3 proves that if (zl, zk) ∈ Esingle, the weight wlk = χlk is
given by the resistance of the straight route from zl to zk.
Let us focus on l-trees over G whose root is a state zl ∈ diag(A). Recall now that the
resistance of the tree is the sum of the weights of all the edges constituting the tree as defined
in Subsection II-B. Then, we have the following lemma in terms of the stochastic potential of
zl, which is the minimal resistance among all l-trees in G(l).
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diag A
Kruskal's Algorithm
Fig. 1. Image of Kruskal’s Algorithm
Lemma 5 Consider the weighted directed graph G constituted from the Markov process {P εt } in-
duced by PHPIP applied to a constrained potential game Γ. Let us denote by T = (diag(A), El,W)
the l-tree giving the stochastic potential of zl ∈ diag(A). If Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied,
then the edge set El must be a subset of Esingle.
Proof: The edges of G, denoted by E , are divided into two classes: Es := Esingle and
Ed := E \Es. From Lemma 3, the weights of the edges in Es are smaller than 2. We next consider
the weights of the edges in Ed. Because of the nature of PHPIP, any agent cannot change his
action to another one without explorations when z(t) ∈ diag(A), and hence exploration should
be executed more than twice in order that the transition along with an edge in Ed occurs. This
implies that the weights of edges in Ed should be greater than 2.
Hereafter, we simply rewrite the weights of the edges Es by ws(< 2) and those of Ed by
wd(≥ 2) and build the minimal resistance tree with root zl over this simplified graph. Note that
this simplification does not change the elements of the edge set El. It should be noted that from
Assumption 1 all recurrent communication classes (diag(A)) can be connected by passing only
through straight routes. From the procedure of Kruskal’s Algorithm, edges with resistances wd
are never chosen as edges of the minimal tree as illustrated in Fig. 1. Thus, the tree giving the
stochastic potential must consist only of the edges in Es, which completes the proof.
We are now ready to state the following proposition on the stochastically stable states (Defi-
nition 4) for the Markov process {P εt }.
November 6, 2018 DRAFT
18
Optimal Nash 
Equilibrium
Optimal Nash 
Equilibrium
Fig. 2. Resistance Trees (the left tree should have a greater resistance than the right)
Proposition 3 Consider {P εt } induced by PHPIP applied to a constrained potential game Γ. If
Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied, then the stochastically stable states are included in diag(ζ(Γ)),
with the set of the optimal Nash equilibria ζ(Γ).
Proof: From Proposition 1, Lemmas 1 and 2, it is sufficient to prove that the states in
diag(A) with the minimal stochastic potential over G are included in ζ(Γ).
Let us introduce the notations znonopt = (anonopt, anonopt) ∈ diag(A) with a non optimal action
anonopt and zopt = (aopt, aopt) ∈ diag(A) with an optimal Nash equilibrium aopt. If znonopt is the
root of a tree T , there exists a unique route from zopt to znonopt over T . From Lemma 5, the
route r is an m-straight-route for some m. Now, we can build a tree T ′ with root zopt such that
only the route r is replaced by its reverse route r′ (Fig. 2). Then, we have λ(r) > λ(r′) from
Lemma 4 since φ(aopt) > φ(anonopt). Thus, the resistance of T ′ is smaller than that of T and the
stochastic potential of zopt is smaller than the resistance of T ′. The statement holds regardless
of the selection of anonopt. This completes the proof.
We next consider PIPIP with time-varying ε(t) and prove strong ergodicity of {P εt }.
Lemma 6 The Markov process {P εt } induced by PIPIP applied to a constrained potential game
Γ is strongly ergodic.
Proof: We use Proposition 2 for the proof. Conditions (B2), (B3) in Proposition 2 can be
proved in the same way as [7]. We thus show only the satisfaction of Condition (B1). As in
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(13), the probability of transition z1 → z2 is given by
P εz1z2 =
∏
i∈Λ1
ε
|Ri(a
1
i )| − 1
×
∏
i∈Λ2
(1− ε)×
∏
i∈Λ3
ε
|Ri(a
1
i )| − hi
×
×
∏
i∈Λ4
(1− ε)κε∆i ×
∏
i∈Λ5
(1− ε)(1− κε∆i). (23)
Since ε(t) is strictly decreasing, there is t0 ≥ 1 such that t0 is the first time when
(1− ε(t))(1− κε(t)∆i) ≥
ε(t)
C − 1
, 1− ε(t) ≥
ε(t)(1−∆i)
κ(C − 1)
(24)
holds. Note that the existence of ε satisfying (24) is guaranteed from the condition (9). For all
t ≥ t0, we have
P εz1z2(t) ≥
(
ε(t)
C − 1
)n
. (25)
The remaining part of the proof is the same as [7] and omit it in this paper.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1. From Lemma 6, the distribution µ(ε(t)) converges
to the unique distribution µ∗ from any initial state. In addition, we also have µ∗ = µ(0) =
limε→0µ(ε) from limt→∞ε(t) = 0. We have already proved from Propositions 1 and 3 that any
state z satisfying µz(0) > 0 must be included in diag(ζ(Γ)). Therefore,
limt→∞Prob[z(t) ∈ diag(ζ(Γ))] = 1,
is proved, which completes the proof of Theorem 1. Theorem 2 is also proved from Proposition
1, Lemma 1 and Proposition 3.
V. APPLICATION TO SENSOR COVERAGE PROBLEM
In this section we demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed learning algorithm PIPIP
through experiments of the sensor coverage problem investigated e.g. in [3], [4], [5] whose
objective is to cover a mission space efficiently using distributed control strategies. In particular,
the problem of this section is formulated based on [7] with some modifications.
A. Problem Formulation
We suppose that the mission space to be covered is given by Qc ⊂ R2 and that a density
function W c(q), q ∈ Qc is defined over Qc. In particular, to constitute a game in the form of the
previous sections, we also prepare a discretized mission space Q consisting of a finite number
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of points in Qc. Accordingly, we also define the discretized version of the density W (q), q ∈ Q
such that W (q) = W c(q) ∀q ∈ Q.
In the problem, the position of agent i in the mission space Q is regarded as the action ai to
be determined, and hence the action set Ai is given by a subset of Q for all i ∈ V . Namely,
each agent i chooses his action ai from the finite set Ai ⊆ Q at each iteration and move toward
the corresponding point.
Suppose now that each sensor has a limited sensing radius rm and that agent i located at
ai ∈ Q may sense an event at q ∈ Q iff q ∈ D(ai) := {q ∈ Q| ‖q − ai‖ ≤ rm}. We also denote
by nq(a) the number of agents such that q ∈ D(ai) when agents take the joint action a. Then,
we define the function
φ(a) =
∑
q∈Q
nq(a)∑
l=1
W (q)
l
dq.
This function means, as nq(a) increases, the sensing accuracy at q ∈ Q improves but the
increment decreases, which captures the characteristics of the sensor coverage problem. Note
that the authors in [7] take account of energy consumption of sensors in addition to coverage
performance and claim that the function φ cannot be a performance measure. However, we do
not consider the energy consumption and what is the best selection of the performance measure
depends on the subjective views of designers. We thus identify maximization of φ with the global
objective of the group letting φ be the potential function.
Let us now introduce the utility function
Ui(a) =
∑
q∈D(ai)
W (q)
nq(a)
.
Then, equation (1) holds for the above potential function φ [7] and hence a potential game is
constituted. It is also easy to confirm that the utility Ui(a) can be locally computed if we assume
feedbacks of Wq, q ∈ D(ai) from environment and of the selected actions aj, j 6= i only from
neighboring agents specified by the 2rm-disk proximity communication graph [1].
B. Objectives
In this section, we run two experiments whose objectives are listed below.
• Demonstration of effectiveness: Theorems 1 and 2 assure statements after infinitely long
time but it is required in practice that the algorithm works in finite time. The first objective
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Fig. 3. Mobile Robot
is thus to check if the agents successfully cover the mission space (i) even in the presence
of constraints such as obstacles and mobility constraints, and (ii) in the absence of the prior
information on the density function. The second objective is to compare its performance
with the learning algorithm DISL, which is chosen to ensure fair comparisons. Indeed, the
other existing algorithms require either or both of prior knowledge on density or free motion
without constraints.
• Adaptability to environmental changes: In many real applications of sensor coverage schemes,
it is required for sensors to change the configuration according to the surrounding environ-
ment. In particular, the density function can be time-varying e.g. in the scenario such as
measuring of radiation quantity in the air and sampling of some chemical material and
temperature in the ocean. It is expected for payoff-based algorithms to naturally adapt to
such environmental changes without altering action selection rules and any complicated
decision-making processes due to the characteristics that prior knowledge on environments
except for Ai is not assumed. We thus check the function by using a Gaussian density
function whose mean moves as time advances.
C. Experimental System
In the experiments, we use four mobile robots with four wheels which can move in any
direction (Fig. 3). Fig. 4 shows the schematic of the experimental system. A camera (Firefly
MV (ViewPLUS Inc.) with lenses LTV2Z3314CS-IR (Raymax Inc.)) is mounted over the field.
The image information is sent to a PC and processed to extract the pose of robots from the image
by the image processing library OpenCV 2.0. Note that a board with two colored feature points
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Fig. 4. Experimental Schematic
Fig. 5. Setting of Experiment 1
is attached to each robot as in Fig. 3 to help the extraction. According to the extracted poses,
the actions to be taken by agents are computed based on learning algorithms. However, in the
experiments, the selected actions are not executed directly since collisions among robots must be
avoided. For this purpose, a local decision-making mechanism checks whether collisions would
occur if the selected actions were executed. The mechanism is designed based on heuristics and
we avoid mentioning the details since it is not essential. If the answer of the mechanism is
yes, the agents decide to stay at the current position. Otherwise, the selected actions are sent as
reference positions together with the current poses to the local velocity and position PI controller
implemented on a digital signal processor DS-1104 (dSPACE Inc.). Then, the eventual velocity
command is sent to each robot via a wireless communication device XBee (Digi International
Inc.).
The following setup is common in all experiments. The mission space Qc := [0 2.7]m ×
[0 1.8]m is divided into 9× 6 squares with side length 0.3m as in Fig. 5 letting the discretized
set Q be given by the centers of the squares as
Q = {(0.15 + 0.3j, 0.15 + 0.3l)| j ∈ {0, · · · , 8}, l ∈ {0, · · · , 5}}.
The sensing radius rm is set as rm = 0.3m for all robots. We also assume that each agent has
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Fig. 6. Configurations by DISL (Experiment 1)
a mobility constraint
Ri(ai) = {ai ± 0.3(b1, b2) ∈ Ai| b1 ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, b2 ∈ {−1, 0, 1}}.
The initial actions of agents are set as
a1(0) = (0.15, 0.15), a2(0) = (0.15, 0.45), a3(0) = (0.45, 0.15), a4(0) = (0.45, 0.45).
D. Experiment 1
In the first experiment, we demonstrate the effectiveness of PIPIP. For this purpose, we employ
the density function
W (q) = e−
25‖q−µ‖2
9 , µ = (1.95, 1.35)
and prepare obstacles at
O := {(0.75, 1.35), (1.05, 1.05), (1.35, 0.75), (1.65, 0.45)}. (26)
Namely, in the experiment, the action sets are given by Ai = Q \O. The setup is illustrated in
Fig. 5, where the region with high density is colored by yellow and the red cross mark indicates
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Fig. 7. Configurations by PIPIP (Experiment 1)
the actions prohibited to be taken by the obstacles. Under the situation, we see that there exist
some Nash undesirable equilibria just ahead on the left of the obstacles. It should be also noted
that each robot does not know the function W (q) a priori.
We first run DISL under the above situation with the exploration rate ε = 0.15. Then, the
resulting configurations at 0, 150, 300, 450, 600 and 700 steps are shown in Fig. 6. Under
the setting, three robots cannot reach the colored region at least in 700 step. It is now easily
confirmed that the configurations at 600 and 700[step] are Nash equilibria only for the three
robots and hence they cannot increase utilities by any one agent’s action change.
We next run PIPIP letting the parameter ε be fixed as ε = 0.15 and setting κ = 0.5 (namely,
PHPIP is actually run in the experiment). Fig. 7 shows resulting configurations at the same steps
as Fig. 6. Surprisingly, we see that all the robots eventually avoid the obstacles and arrive at
the colored region though they initially do not know where is important. Such a behavior is
never achieved by conventional coverage control schemes. The time responses of the potential
function φ for PIPIP and DISL are illustrated in Fig. 8, where the solid line shows the response
for PIPIP and the dashed line for DISL. As is apparent from the above investigations, PIPIP
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Fig. 8. Time Evolution of Potential Function for ε = 0.15
(Experiment 1)
Fig. 9. Time Evolution of Potential Function for ε = 0.3
(Experiment 1)
achieves a higher potential function value than DISL.
Though we can show only one sample due to the page constraints, similar results are obtained
for both DISL and PIPIP through several trials. From the results, we claim that PIPIP has a
stronger tendency to escape undesirable Nash equilibria than DISL, which is also confirmed by
the meaning of the irrational decision. Of course, the results strongly depend on the value of
exploration rate ε. We thus show the time evolution of the function φ for ε = 0.3 in Fig. 9. We
see from Fig. 9 that some agents executing DISL also do not reach the important region even for
ε = 0.3, which seems to be quite high probability as an exploration rate. Indeed, the fluctuation of
the responses is large and an agent with PIPIP overcomes the obstacle again leaving the colored
region. From all the above results, we thus can state that guarantees of only convergence to
Nash equilibria can be a significant problem not only from the theoretical point of view but
also from the practical viewpoint. Though much more thorough comparisons are necessary in
order to make the claim on superiority of PIPIP over DISL confident, PIPIP achieves a better
performance than DISL at least in the setup.
E. Experiment 2
We next demonstrate the adaptability of PIPIP to environmental changes, where we get rid of
the obstacle O and hence Ai = Q. In the experiment, we use the following Gaussian density
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Fig. 10. Configurations by PIPIP (Experiment 2)
Fig. 11. Time Evolution of Potential Function (Experiment 2)
function whose mean gradually moves.
W c(q) = e−
25‖q−µ(t)‖2
9 , µ(t) =


(0.45, 0.45), if t ∈ [0, 300]
(0.00375t− 0.6750, 0.00225t− 0.225), if t ∈ (300, 700)
(1.95, 1.35), if t ≥ 700
It is worth noting that agents select actions without using any prior information on the density.
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Figs 10 and 11 respectively illustrate the resulting configurations at 0, 200, 400, 600, 800
and 1000 steps and time evolution of the potential function φ. We see from Fig. 10 that agents
gather at around the most important region at any time instant while learning the environmental
changes. Fig. 11 also shows that the potential function keeps almost the same level during whole
time, which indicates that the agents successfully track the most important region. From these
results, as expected, agents executing PIPIP successfully adapt to the environmental changes
without changing the action selection rule at all. Such a behavior is also never achieved by
conventional coverage control schemes.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have developed a new learning algorithm Payoff-based Inhomogeneous
Partially Irrational Play (PIPIP) for potential game theoretic cooperative control of multi-agent
systems. The present algorithm is based on Distributed Inhomogeneous Synchronous Learning
(DISL) presented in [7] and inherits several desirable features of DISL. However, unlike DISL,
PIPIP allows agents to make irrational decisions, that is, take an action giving a lower utility from
the past two actions. Thanks to the decision, we have succeeded proving convergence of the joint
action to the potential function maximizers while escaping from undesirable Nash equilibria.
Then, we have demonstrated the utility of PIPIP through experiments on a sensor coverage
problem. It has been revealed through the demonstration that the present learning algorithm works
even in a finite-time interval and agents successfully arrive at around the optimal Nash equilibria
in the presence of obstacles in the mission space. In addition, we also have seen through an
experiment with a moving density function that PIPIP has adaptability to environmental changes,
which is a function expected for payoff-based learning algorithms.
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